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INDEPENDENT ADOPTION: THE INADEQUACIES
OF STATE LAW
Adoption is a legal process by which adopting parents take into their
family the child of another.' Licensed child-placing agencies facilitate
most adoptions.2 Biological parents or unlicensed intermediaries also as-
sist in the placement of children with adoptive parents.3 Commentators
traditionally refer to adoptions facilitated by biological parents or unli-
censed intermediaries as independent adoptions.
4
There are significant procedural differences between an agency adop-
tion and an independent adoption.' In an agency adoption, a licensed
child-placing agency conducts a thorough investigation of the adoptive
parents before making a placement determination.6 In an independent
adoption, however, the state defers the investigation of the adoptive par-
ents until after the child is placed in an adoptive home.7
Proponents and critics have debated the wisdom of independent adop-
1. Adoption was originally developed to insure intrafamily succession of property and to carry
on the family name. See Wadlington, Adoption of Persons Under Seventeen in Louisiana, 36 TUL. L.
REV. 201 (1962).
2. Comment, Independent Adoptions: Is the Black and White Beginning to Appear in the Con-
troversy Over Gray-Market Adoptions?. 18 DuQ. L. REV. 629 (1980).
3. Intermediaries are usually doctors, lawyers, or social workers. Bradley, Black-Market
Adoptions, 22 CATH. LAW. 42, 54 (1976). Pennsylvania defines intermediary as "any person or
persons or agency acting between the parent or parents and the proposed adoptive parent or parents
in arranging an adoptive placement." PA. STAT. ANN. art. 23 § 2102 (Purdon Supp. 1984). Esti-
mates indicate that lawyers made 53% and doctors 37% of independent placements. See W.
MEEZAN, S. KATZ & E. Russo, ADOPTIONS WITHOUT AGENCIES: A STUDY OF INDEPENDENT
ADOPTIONS 50 (1978).
4. Independent adoptions account for 21% of the adoptions in the United States annually.
Comment, supra note 2, at 636-37; see also Grove, Independent Adoptions: The Case for the Gray
Market, 13 VILL. L. REV. 116, 117 (1967). For a discussion of the decline in agency adoptions, see
W. MEEZAN, S. KATZ & E. Russo, supra note 3, at 26.
Commentators also refer to independent adoptions as private placements or "the gray market."
Comment, supra note 2, at 630.
5. Bradley, supra note 3, at 53. For a comparison of the procedural differences between
agency and independent adoptions, see Article, supra note 2, at 633-34.
6. Comment, supra note 2, at 663-64.
7. Evans, Independent Adoptions: In Whose Best Interest 53 OKLA. B.J. 1805, 1809 (1982).
See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 63.122(6) (West Supp. 1985). Once the state places the child in the
adoptive home, the procedures for agency or independent adoptions are largely the same. Investiga-
tion requirements, however, may vary. For an explanation of state investigation requirements, see
infra notes 44-60 and accompanying text.
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tions for decades.' Proponents point out that independent adoptions al-
low for the immediate placement of the child with adoptive parents.
Proponents argue that immediate placement promotes the formation of
the parent-child bond.9
Critics of independent adoption argue that the investigation of the
adoptive parents in an independent adoption is inadequate to ensure that
the placement serves the best interests of the child." Moreover, oppo-
nents of independent adoptions believe that independent adoptions per-
petuate "black-market" adoptions. 1 These opponents have coined the
terms "gray-market" and "black-market" adoption to distinguish be-
tween legal and illegal independent adoptions.2 A legitimate gray-mar-
ket adoption becomes an illegal black-market adoption when the
intermediary or biological parent accepts an illegal fee."
As the terms gray- and black-market suggest, a market for adoptable
children exists. The adoption market, like any other, is influenced by the
law of supply and demand.' 4 When demand exceeds supply, the price of
a good increases. In the adoption market, the good being sold is a child.
In recent years, the availability of abortion and the increased use of
contraceptives have contributed to a decrease in the supply of adoptable
infants.' 5 In states that permit independent adoptions, adopting parents
compete for the short supply of adoptable infants, thereby increasing the
infants' "market value."' 6 Seizing this opportunity, unscrupulous in-
8. Comment, Moppets on the Market: The Problem of Unregulated Adoptions, 59 YALE L.J,
715 (1950).
9. Evans, supra note 7, at 1806.
10. Comment, supra note 2, at 634. The interests of the child should be paramount in the
adoption process. Grove, supra note 4, at 116.
11. Comment, supra note 2, at 636. For an account of black-market procedures, see Grove,
supra note 4, at 118-21.
12. Comment, supra note 8, at 715 n.2.
13. Bradley, supra note 3, at 54.
14. Id. at 48 n. 1 and accompanying text. Critics argue that under the black-market system, the
child's interest in having fit parents is ignored. Rather, the market judges parents by their ability to
pay. Id. at 51.
15. W. MEEZAN, S. KATz & E. Russo, supra note 3, at 9. Another factor contributing to this
"baby shortage" is the growing number of single parents opting to keep their illegitimate children.
Id; see also Bradley, supra note 3, at 48-49.
The shortage is greatest for healthy white infants. Comment, supra note 2, at 49 n.6. There is,
however, an abundance of so-called "hard to place" children: minority, emotionally disturbed, or
handicapped children. Id. This Note focuses on independent adoptions of healthy white infants.
Moreover, an average five-year waiting period to receive a child through a child-placing agency
evidences this shortage. J. MCNAMARA, THE ADOPTION ADVISOR 75 (1975).
16. Intermediaries have allegedly sold infants to adoptive couples for as much as $50,000. W.
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termediaries have secured sizeable profits by "selling" children to the
highest bidders.' 7 This abuse of the independent adoption process results
from inadequate state adoption laws."8
This Note analyzes six aspects of state adoption statutes to determine
their effectiveness, 9 identify areas for reform, and make recommenda-
tions for improved legislation. In Part I, this Note will discuss limita-
tions on who may place children for adoption, and the problems arising
from those limitations.20 Part II analyzes the process of investigating
adopting parents in connection with a petition for adoption.2' Part III
contains a brief overview of adoption residency requirements.22 In Part
IV, this Note examines the related issue of restrictions on the importa-
tion of children.23 Part V discusses statutes requiring parents to disclose
adoption expenses. 24 In Part VI, this Note argues that violators of adop-
tion laws should often be subject to criminal penalties.25 This Note then
will conclude with a proposed model statute for regulating independent
adoptions.26
I. LIMITATIONS ON WHO MAY PLACE CHILDREN FOR ADOPTION
Statutes governing who may place children for adoption determine the
legality of independent adoption in each state.27 Generally, statutes pro-
vide for placement by state agencies, state licensed child-placing agen-
MEEZAN, S. KATZ & E. Russo, supra note 3, at 140-43. For a brief discussion of market values of
children, see generally R. ISAAC, ADOPTIONS-A CHILD TODAY 75-79 (1965).
17. Intermediaries use a technique called "auction blocking" to pit adoptive couples against
each other in a bidding war. See Bradley, supra note 3, at 51 n. 15.
18. See S. REP. No. 167, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 26 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEWS 557, 571 [hereinafter cited as Report].
19. Ascertaining the effectiveness of adoption statutes in preventing black-market adoptions is
difficult for two reasons. First, because this is essentially a black-market transaction, little case law
discusses their effects. Biological mothers litigate a few actions, contending that their consent to the
adoption was involuntary. Bradley, supra note 3, at 59.
Second, because black-market adoptions are illegal, states do not keep accurate records of the
number of black-market adoptions. Commentators estimate that up to 30% of independent adop-
tions are made on the black-market. Id. at 49 n.7.
20. See infra notes 27-43 and accompanying text.
21. See infra notes 44-60 and accompanying text.
22. See infra notes 61-71 and accompanying text.
23. See infra notes 72-86 and accompanying text.
24. See infra notes 87-101 and accompanying text.
25. See infra notes 102-117 and accompanying text.
26. The proposed statute addresses those areas of independent adoption regulation focused on
in this Note. The proposal is not a comprehensive statutory scheme.
27. Oklahoma and Idaho do not have statutes that stipulate who may place a child for adop-
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cies, the biological parents, or intermediaries. All states permit
placements by a state agency.28 In addition, almost every state statute
permits placements by licensed child-placing agencies.29 Placements by
licensed agencies benefit the adoption process first by shouldering much
of the case load that would otherwise fall upon the government; second,
by allowing governmental supervision of adoption through the licensing
process; 30 and third, by providing protection against black-market
sales.3'
Most states permit placement by biological parents.32 Several states,
however, impose restrictions on biological parent placements. For exam-
ple, a few states limit biological parent placement to the home of a rela-
tive.3 3 Other states require state approval before permitting biological
parent placement.34
In those states that permit biological parents, but not intermediaries,
to place children for adoption, intermediary black market profiteering
continues. Intermediaries arrange adoptions35 and circumvent restrictive
statutes by having biological parents actually hand the child to the adop-
tive parents.36
More than one-third of the states permit placements by intermediaries
tion. Thus, by omission, these states permit independent adoptions. See Evans, supra note 7, at
1806.
28. Examples of such state agencies include New Mexico's Social Services Division of Human
Services Department, South Carolina's Children's Bureau, and Vermont's Department of Social
Welfare.
29. Examples of licensed child-placing agencies include the Catholic Social Service and the
United Way.
30. Many states extensively regulate licensed child-placing agencies. See, e.g., TEX. HUM. REs.
CODE ANN. §§ 42.041-.073 (Vernon 1980 & Supp. 1985) (including provisions for inspection of the
agency, maintenance of records by the agency, license application procedures, standards for granting
licenses, license renewal procedures, and license revocation procedures).
31. See Bradley, supra note 3, at 56-61.
32. The states that do not allow placement by biological parents are Mississippi, South Caro.
lina, Tennessee, Vermont and West Virginia. See Appendix 1.
33. These states are Connecticut, Delaware, New Jersey, North Carolina and North Dakota.
Id.
34. These states are Indiana, Kentucky and Massachusetts. Id.
35. "Necessary arrangements" includes payment of hospital expenses, physicians' fees or living
expenses of the biological mother. See generally W. MEEZAN, S. KATZ & E. Russo, supra note 3, at
69-71.
36. Comment, supra note 2, at 637. Cf In re Anonymous, 46 Misc.2d 928, 261 N.Y.S.2d 439
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in at least limited situations.3 7 For example, some states require prior
state approval before an intermediary places a child in an adoptive
home."8 Louisiana requires that intermediaries represent a specific adop-
tive couple before the intermediary takes the adoptable child.39 Missouri
limits intermediary eligibility to attorneys, physicians, or clergymen of
the biological parents.' Conversely, New York imposes no limitations
on intermediaries and its statutory scheme expressly provides for in-
dependent adoptions.4"
States could eliminate black market adoptions by prohibiting in-
dependent adoptions.4 2 This solution, however, would strain the capaci-
ties of already overburdened state adoption agencies.4 3 Thus, enhanced
regulation of independent adoptions best addresses the problems of the
black market.
II. INVESTIGATION REQUIREMENTS4 4
Each state requires investigation in connection with a petition for
adoption.45 Requirements, however, vary. Several states waive the inves-
tigation requirement when a state agency places the child.46 In addition,
states usually waive the investigation requirements when the petitioner is
37. See Appendix 1.
38. These states are Indiana, Kentucky and Massachusetts. Id.
39. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 9 § 422.5 (West Supp. 1985).
40. Mo. ANN. STAT. § 210.481(2) (Vernon 1983).
41. N.Y. DoM. REL. LAW § 116 (Consol. 1979).
42. Comment, supra note 2, at 630. States cannot, however, stop all black-market adoption
techniques. One technique is to bypass the adoption process entirely. The biological mother simply
registers at a hospital under the adoptive mother's name, allowing the child's birth certificate to
contain the adoptive parent's surname. See Sitomer, Baby Sale-For Big Profits, Christian Science
Monitor, June 24, 1974, at 5, col. I.
Eliminating independent adoptions may in fact increase the occurence of black-market adoptions
because the demand for children would exceed the agencies' abilities to supply children. See Com-
ment, supra note 2, at 637.
43. See Bradley, supra note 3, at 56.
44 This Note focuses on three aspects of the investigation process: (1) whether "investigation"
includes both pre- and postplacement studies, (2) the length of time within which the investigation
must be completed, and (3) who can conduct the investigation. For a discussion of the substantive
content of the investigation, see W. MEEZAN, S. KATZ & E. Russo, supra note 3, at 26-27, 93;
Grove, supra note 4, at 129-32.
45. Typically, the investigation's purpose is to determine whether the adoptive home is suitable
for and in the best interests of the child. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 25.23.100(d) (1983). Some states
focus the investigation on verification of the allegations in the petition for adoption. See, e.g., N.Y.
DOM. REL. LAW § 116(3) (Consol. 1979).
46. See, e~g., ARK. STAT. ANN. § 56-212(c) (1983). States grant this exemption because agen-
cie, conduct their own investigations prior to placement. M. LEAVY & R. WEINBERG, LAW OF
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the child's stepparent.47 Unless the state grants a waiver, almost every
state requires investigation. a
Unfortunately, state investigation regulations for independent adop-
tions fail to mandate preplacement investigations.4 9 Only five states re-
quire preplacement investigations. 50  Without preplacement
investigation, unknown risks may threaten the adopted child."1 Many
couples utilize the independent adoption process because they cannot
meet licensed agencies' investigation requirements. Because adopting
parents may circumvent preplacement investigation through the use of
the independent adoption process, all states should require preplacement
investigations for independent adoptions. 2
To insure protection of the child's interests, state statutes should pro-
vide for sufficient time to allow a thorough investigation.53 Most state
ADOPTION 42 (4th ed. 1979). Commentators generally recognize that agency investigations are su-
perior to those mandated by statute. See Grove, supra note 4, at 129-31.
47. See, ag., TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-1-188(a) (1984). The Tennessee statute, in accord with
several states, also provides a waiver when the petitioner is a grandparent, uncle or aunt. Id. See
also ALASKA STAT. § 25.23.100(g) (1983).
48. Four states provide for optional investigation. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 56-212(b) (1983); KAN.
STAT. ANN. § 59-2278(c) (1983); Miss. CODE ANN. § 93-17-11 (1973); Wyo. STAT. § 1-22-
111(a)(ii) (1977). In 1967, ten states provided for optional investigation. Grove, supra note 4, at
129.
49. Failure to investigate thoroughly an adoptive couple may lead to irreparable damage to the
child. A Nevada study, for example, uncovered the adoption of a child by a man who had previously
been charged with sexual molestation of children. Grove, supra note 4, at 121.
50. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 63.092 (West. Supp. 1984); IOWA CODE ANN. § 600.8 (West 1981);
MONT. CODE ANN. § 40-8-109 (1983); NEV. REV. STAT. § 127.280 (1981); WA. REV. CODE ANN.
§ 26.33.180 (Supp. 1985).
51. The state must balance competing factors when considering the substantive requirements of
a preplacement investigation. States should strive to place a child as soon as possible, but the possi-
bility of mistakenly placing a child in an abusive home argues for careful consideration. In addition,
unless the child is placed almost immediately after birth, the biological mother will have to keep it,
which may be contrary to her desires, or the state will have to place the child in the custody of an
agency during the preplacement investigation. The competing factors suggest that while there is a
need to protect the child through preplacement investigations, the investigation should be limited to
screening out those adoptive parents who would pose a danger to the child.
While studies do not indicate that independent adoptions are significantly less successful than
agency adoptions, agency adoptions require preplacement investigations, affording maximum protec-
tion to the child. Independent adoptions do not. See supra note 7 and accompanying text. For a
discussion of the results of surveys comparing agency adoptions to independent adoptions, see
Grove, supra note 4, at 122-25; Podolski, Abolishing Baby Buying: Limiting Independent Adoption
Placement, 9 FAM. L.Q. 547, 548 n.2 (1975).
52. Evans, supra note 7, at 1809.
53. The interests of the child are paramount in the adoption process. Time constraints on
investigations should be designed to protect those interests. See supra note 10.
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statutes require that the state complete its investigation in 30"4 to 18055
days. A few state statutes require the state to complete its investigation
within a "reasonable time."5 6 Generally, however, ninety days should
insure a thorough investigation," while a longer period would add little
to the investigation's thoroughness and would constitute an unnecessary
delay.
Typically, state statutes require investigation either by a state agency
or by a licensed child-placing agency.58 Several states, however, allow a
court to assign the investigation to another "qualified person."59 Pro-
vided that the courts scrutinize qualifications to determine that the as-
signed person will carefully protect the child's interests, this assignment
process is beneficial.'
III. RESIDENCY REQUIREMENTS
In nearly one quarter of independent adoptions,6" the adoptive parents
live in one state and the adopted child was born in another state.62 Few
states, however, regulate the importation or exportation of children for
purposes of adoption.63 In addition, many states impose only minimal
residency requirements on persons petitioning for adoption within their
borders. These factors make evasion of strict adoption statutes simple, 64
and in many cases, profitable.65
Adoption statutes in most states include venue provisions that regulate
the persons who may petition for adoption. 66 These statutes usually re-
54. See, eg., ALASKA STAT. § 25.23.100 (1983).
55, CAL. CIV. CODE ANN. § 226.6 (Deering Supp. 1984). Several states specify time con-
straints within the 30 to 180-day range. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13 § 912 (1981) (60 days);
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 63.122(6) (West Supp. 1984); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 19 § 533 (1984).
56. See, e.g., KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-2278 (1983).
57. By allowing 90 days for the completion of the investigation, the disparity in quality between
agency investigations and statutorily-mandated investigations will be diminished. See supra note 46.
58. See, e.g., ARK. STAT. ANN. § 56-212(b) (1983). Louisiana is the only state that requires a
state agency to conduct the investigation. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9.427 (West Supp. 1984).
59. See, e.g., ARK. STAT. ANN. § 56-212 (1983).
60. In Oklahoma, however, a statute containing the "qualified person" language resulted in
persons without sufficient expertise in the psychological aspects of adoption conducting investiga-
tions. Evans, supra note 7, at 1810.
61. W. MEEZAN, S. KATZ & E. Russo, supra note 3, at 49.
62, See supra note 19 and accompanying text.
63. See infra notes 72 & 75 and accompanying text.
64. Bradley, supra note 3, at 60-61.
65. See supra note 17.
66. See e.g.. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 56-205 (1983).
Number 4]
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quire the prospective parents to file for adoption in either the county in
which they reside, the county in which the child reside, or the county in
which the agency having custody of the child is located. 67 A few states
require a prospective parent to petition in the county where he or she
resides.68 Most states, however, allow the prospective parent to file a
petition either where the child reside, where the agency is located, or
both. Adoptive parents may then locate a child and file an adoption peti-
tion in that state even if they are not residents. The parents can transport
the child back to their home state, thereby circumventing their home
state's more restrictive adoption laws.
Adoptive parents can also circumvent statutes requiring the filing of
the petition in the county in which they reside. Many states only require
the prospective parents to reside in the county of adoption at the time
that they fie their petition.69 In states imposing longer residency re-
quirements, adoptive parents can establish temporary residences solely
for purposes of meeting these requirements.70
All states may more effectively prevent the circumvention of adoption
laws by requiring petitioners to be residents. In addition, a longer peti-
tioner residency period may prevent the temporary residence problem
raised above.7 1 The facilitation of black-market activity through inter-
state adoptions72 calls for the establishment of residency requirements
that will deter, if not wholly prevent, interstate black-market adoptions.
IV. RESTRICTIONS ON THE IMPORTATION OF
CHILDREN FOR ADOPTION
7 3
In addition to residency requirements, statutes restricting the importa-
67. See, eg., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, § 902 (1981) (petition to be filed where petitioner resides
or where agency is located); HAWAII REV. STAT. § 578-1 (1976) (petition to be filed where petitioner
or child resides, or where agency is located); NEB. REV. STAT. § 43-102 (1984) (petition to be filed
where petitioner resides); S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-7-1680 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1985) (petitioner must
be a bona-fide resident; petition to be filed where petitioner or child resides).
68. See, eg., NEB. REV. STAT. § 43-102 (1984).
69. See, eg., TEx. FAM. CODE ANN. § 16.02 (Vernon Supp. 1985).
70. See, eg., infra note 85.
71. Ky. REV. STAT. § 199.470(1) (1984) (requiring petitioners to be residents or have resided in
the state for 12 months); MIss. CODE ANN. § 93-17-3 (Supp. 1984) (90-day residency requirement);
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 48-4(c) (1984) (6-month residency requirement).
72. See infra note 74 and accompanying text.
73. Florida and Minnesota have statutes regulating exportation of children for purposes of
adoption. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 63.207 (West Supp. 1985); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 257.06 (West Supp.
1984). Exportation statutes were useful in deterring illegal placements outside the state. Note,
[Vol. 63:753
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tion of children for purposes of adoption74 will effectively eliminate inter-
state black-market adoptions. Most black-market adoptions occur in
states with weak adoption laws.75 This fact suggests the need for legisla-
tion restricting the importation of children into a state for purposes of
adoption. Only eleven states, however, have enacted such legislation.76
Typically, these statutes require a person who is importing a child into
the state for purposes of placement or adoption to obtain the prior con-
sent of the state.7 7
Other restrictions on the importation of children for adoption differ
greatly. Kansas, for example, prohibits bringing a child into the state
absent proof that the child is not incurably diseased, feebleminded, or of
vicious character. 78 Rhode Island requires that persons importing an un-
related child into the state file a report within fifteen days of entry.7 9
North Dakota, taking a tougher position, requires written notification of
the intent to bring a child into the state.8° Connecticut exempts from its
reporting requirement children brought into the state for placement in
the home of a resident relative. 81
The purpose of reporting requirements is to notify the state of the need
to conduct an investigation of the adoptive parents82 and to insure that
however, that the Minnesota exportation statute does not prevent the technique set out at infra note
85,
74. See infra notes 75-86 and accompanying text.
75. Report, supra note 19 passim. Testimony before the Senate Subcommittee also suggested
that uniform adoption regulations would significantly reduce black-market activities. State legisla-
tors have ignored the need for uniformity among the states. Only five states have enacted versions of
the Uniform Adoption Act. MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 4-8-101 to -202 (1983); N.M. STAT. ANN.
§§ 40-7-1 to -11, 40-1-15 to -17 (1984); N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 14-15-01 to -23 (1981); OHIO REV.
CODE ANN. §§ 3107.01 to .19 (Page 1981); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, §§ 60.1 to .23 (West Supp.
1984),
76. ALA. CODE § 38-7-15 (1977); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 17-51 (1983); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13
§ 926 (1984); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 38-315 (1981): MINN. STAT. ANN. § 257.05(1) (West 1982); NEB.
REV, STAT. § 43-704 (1978); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 170-B:23 (1978); N.D. CENT. CODE § 50-12-
14.1 (1982); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 15-7-3 (1981); S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-7-1880 (Law. Co-op. Supp.
1983); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 26-6-10 (1984).
77. See, e.g., N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 170-B:23 (1977).
78. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 38-315 (1981).
79. R.I. GEN. LAWS § 15-7-3 (1981).
80 N.D. CENT. CODE § 50-12-14.1 (1982
81 CONN. GEN. STAT. § 17-51 (1981). In addition, Minnesota provides an exemption only
when the child is brought into the state by a relative for placement in the relative's home.
This exemption extends to a parent, stepparent, grandparent, brother, sister, or aunt or uncle of
the first degree of the child. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 257.05(2) (West 1982).
82. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 38-7-15(a) (1975).
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the child will not later become a public charge. 3 The judiciary's failure
to enforce strictly state reporting requirements, however, impairs the
utility of these statutes.84
The absence of restrictive importation statutes in neighboring states
also impairs the effectiveness of otherwise tough state reporting require-
ments."5 Adoptive couples may evade state statutes restricting the impor-
tation of children by taking advantage of a neighboring state's less
restrictive laws.8 6 Unless states adopt uniform restrictions on the impor-
tation of children for purposes of adoption, state statutes imposing im-
portation restrictions will remain largely ineffective. Although
83. See, eg., ALA. CODE § 38-7-15(a) (1975); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 257.05(1) (West 1982) (re-
quiring the posting of a $1,000 bond and stipulating that the state will remove a child who becomes a
public charge).
84. See, eg., Wolf v. Smith, 435 So. 2d 749 (Ala. Civ. App. 1983). In Wo/, the court held that
adoption statute requirements must be closely followed. The court, however, found failure to com-
ply with the statute insufficient grounds for rendering an adoption void. The statute required the
petitioner to obtain the Department of Pensions and Security's consent before bringing the child into
the state for adoption. Ida at 752. The court reasoned that the best interests of the child would not
be served by setting aside the adoption after the child had lived with the adoptive parents for two
years. Id
Wolf raises the dilemma that courts face when individuals violate adoption statutes. Often, as in
Wolf a child has lived with adoptive parents for such a length of time that removal would not be in
the best interests of the child. But, failure to remove the child undermines the deterence value of the
statute. See generally J. GOLDSTEIN, A. FREUD & A. SOLNIT, BEYOND THE BEST INTERESTS OF
THE CHILD 31-52 (1973). See also In re Adoption of Child by I.T. and K.T., 164 N.J. Super. 476,
397 A.2d 341 (App. Div. 1978) (court refused to remove a child from an adoptive home even though
the child was placed in a home illegally). But see Ex parte Sullivan, 407 So. 2d 559 (Ala. 1981)
(court directed the return of a child to the biological mother because the adoptive parents failed to
comply with Alabama's importation statute).
The proposed statute (see infra text accompanying notes 122-28) attempts to meet the problem of
punishing the adoptive parent. Section 6(c) of the proposed statute affords courts considerable dis-
cretion in punishing participants in illegal adoptions. The statute permits the courts to make a case-
by-ease determination of whether the parents should be punished (if at all) or the adoption should be
voided. Courts must consider the seriousness of the violation and the length of time that the child
has lived with the adoptive parents. Courts can only resolve this issue by balancing the interests of
the child against society's interests in punishing violators, deterring illegal conduct, and eliminating
the black-market in children.
85. See supra note 75 and accompanying text.
86. In Minnesota, for example, the state requires the Commissioner of Public Welfare's consent
before a person can bring a child into the state for purposes of placement or adoption. MINN. STAT.
ANN. § 257.05(1) (West 1982). Minnesota law also provides that no petitioner may file for adoption
unless a licensed agency places the child. The Minnesota statute provides an exception, however, for
a child lawfully adopted in another state if the child and adoptive parents reside in the other state.
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 259.22 (West 1982). Thus, Minnesota law permits a couple to obtain an in-
dependent adoption of an out-of-state child if the couple establishes a temporary residence and
adopts a child in a state that has more lenient placement laws, and then moves back to Minnesota.
See Comment, supra note 2, at 631 n.15.
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restrictions against importation alone will not prevent illegal placements,
they will help insure compliance with state adoption statutes.87
V. DISCLOSURE OF EXPENSES REQUIREMENTS
States may also discourage the black market in children, while main-
taining the independent adoption system, by requiring the disclosure of
placement or adoption expenditures. 8 Thirteen states' statutes already
require disclosure of adoption expenses. Seven states90 with similar
provisions 9 require the adoptive parents to disclose expenditures92 made
in connection with: (1) the birth of the child; (2) the placement of the
child with the adoptive parents; (3) the medical or hospital care received
by the biological mother or the child;9 and (4) services received by any-
87. See Report, supra note 19.
88. See Bradley, supra note 3, at 56-58.
89. ALASKA STAT. § 25.23.090 (1983); ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 8-144 (1974); ARK. STAT.
ANN. § 56-211 (Supp. 1983); CAL. CIV. CODE § 244r (Deering 1971 & Supp. 1985); FLA. STAT.
ANN. § 63.132 (West Supp. 1985); GA. CODE ANN. § 74-407(b) (Supp. 1984); IOWA CODE ANN.
§ 600.9(1) (West 1981); MICH. COMP. LAWS § 710.54(2) (1979); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 9:3-55 (West
Supp. 1985); N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-15-10 (1981); OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 3107.10(a) (Page
1980); PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. tit. 23 § 2531(b)(4) (Purdon 1985); WIs. STAT. ANN. § 48.837(2)(d)
(West Supp. 1984).
90. ALASKA STAT. § 25.23.090 (1983); ARIZ. REv. STAT. ANN. § 8-114 (1974); ARK. STAT.
ANN. § 56-211 (Supp. 1983); GA. CODE ANN. § 74-407(b) (Supp. 1984); IOWA CODE ANN.
§ 600.9(1) (West 1981); NJ. STAT. ANN. § 9:3-55 (West Supp. 1985); N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-15-10
(1981).
91. See, eg., ALASKA STAT. § 25.23.090 (1983). The Alaska statute provides:
Report of petitioner's expenditures. (a) Except as specified in (b) of this section, the peti-
tioner in any proceeding for the adoption of a minor shall file, before the petition is heard, a
full accounting report in a manner acceptable to the court of all disbursements of anything
of value made or agreed to be made by or on behalf of the petitioner in connection with the
adoption. The report shall show any expenses incurred in connection with
(1) the birth of the minor;
(2) placement of the minor with petitioner;
(3) medical or hospital care received by the mother or by the minor during the
mother's prenatal care and confinement; and
(4) services relating to the adoption or to the placement of the minor for adoption
which were received by or on behalf of the petitioner, either natural parent of the
minor, or any other person.
(b) This section does not apply to an adoption by a stepparent whose spouse is a natural
or adoptive parent of the child.
(c) Any report made under this section must be signed and verified by the petitioner.
92. States require disclosure of all expenditures including any value paid or agreed to be paid.
See, e.g., ARIZ. REv. STAT. ANN. § 8-144 (1974).
93. New Jersey requires disclosure of payment of medical expenses of the biological mother
during the pre- and postnatal period. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 9:3-55(a)(3) (West Supp. 1985). The other
six states limit disclosure to expenses incurred during the prenatal period. See supra note 89.
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one in connection with the placement or adoption.94 These statutes ex-
empt from the reporting requirements adoptions by stepparents.95 Six
other states have less standardized disclosure statutes.
96
Most disclosure statutes, however, do not require adoptive parents to
disclose the recipients of their expenditures.97 Without recipient disclo-
sure, a court is unable to verify the petitioner's report.98 But by requiring
adoptive parents to disclose the recipients of their expenditures, a court
could investigate the validity of the disclosures. California, for example,
requires adoptive parents to disclose the names and addresses of each
person who receives payment in connection with a placement or adop-
tion.99 Michigan law states that persons involved in the placement of an
adopted child must testify to their adherence to statutory require-
ments."° A combination of Michigan's mandatory testimony rule, Cali-
fornia's disclosure of the recipients of expenditures requirement, and the
existing disclosure10 1 requirements of most states102 would prove an ef-
fective verification method that would deter black-market adoptions.
94. Typically, the statutes require disclosure of expenses incurred in connection with services
rendered by or on behalf of the adoptive parents, the biological parents of the child, or any other
person. See, eg., ARK. STAT. ANN. § 56-211(a)(4) (Supp. 1983).
95. See, eg., ALASKA STAT. § 25.23.090(b) (1983).
96. CAL. CIV. CODE § 224r. (Deering 1971 & Supp. 1985); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 63.132(l)(d)
(West Supp. 1985) (also requiring the adoptive parents to disclose any payments made for the living
expenses of the biological mother); MICH. COMP. LAWS § 710.54(2) (1971); OHio REV. CODE ANN.
§ 3107.10(A) (Page 1980) (Ohio's broader approach requires the adoptive parents to file a full ac-
counting of all disbursements made in connection with the placement or adoption of the child); PA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 23 § 2531(b)(4) (Purdon Supp. 1985) requiring only an itemized accounting of all
payments made to an intermediary).
97. See supra note 90.
98. One study points out that black-market adoptions cannot succeed unless the adoptive par-
ents cooperate with the intermediary. W. MEEZAN, S. KATZ & E. Russo, supra note 3. Many
adoptive parents, however, are willing to cooperate with the intermediary even to the point of perjur-
ing themselves. Bradley, supra note 3, at 59 n.56.
99. CAL. CIv. CODE § 224r. (Deering 1971 & Supp. 1985). The California statute also requires
the disclosure of any party who participates in any way, directly or indirectly, in the handling of
such payments. Wisconsin imposes disclosure requirements similar to those of California. Wis.
STAT. ANN. § 48.837(2)(d) (West Supp. 1984). Increased disclosure requirements will not be effec-
tive, however, unless the state couples the requirements with penalties severe enough to deter adop-
tive parents from conspiring with black-marketers to file false disclosure reports. See supra note 97.
100. MICH. COMP. LAWS § 710.54(3) (1979). The Michigan statute applies to persons ".... who
were involved in any way in informing, notifying, exchanging information, identifying, locating,
assisting, or in any other way participating in the contracts or arrangements which, directly or indi-
rectly, led to placement of the person for adoption." Id. Michigan, however, does not require
disclosure of the recipients of payments. See MICH. COMP. LAWS § 710.54 (1979).
101. See supra note 98.
102. See supra note 90.
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VI. CRIMES AND PENALTIES
A number of states impose criminal penalties for violation of statutes
regulating: (1) placement of children for purposes of adoption without a
license;103 (2) payment or receipt of compensation for placement;t°4
(3) advertising placement services without a license to place children for
adoption;105 and (4) inducing a parent to part with his child.'06 Twenty-
four states impose penalties for violation of their placement statutes.'0 7
Fourteen states penalize violators of their compensation statutes.108
Nine states impose penalties for violation of their statutes prohibiting the
advertisement of placement services without a license to place children
for adoption.'0 9 Ten states prohibit inducing parents to offer their chil-
dren for adoption."10 States ineffectively preclude these criminal activi-
ties either because they have no statutory penalty provisions".' or
because their sanctions are insufficient to compel adherence. ' 12
Without penalties, individuals will not comply with adoption statutes.
Surprisingly, some of the states that regulate independent adoptions fre-
quently omit penalty provisions." 13 Thus, to insure maximum compliance
with their adoption laws, states should impose appropriate sanctions.' 14
Moreover, absent adequate penalties, individuals will ignore state
adoption laws. One state levies a $25 to $200 fine for operating a child
103. See, e.g.. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 22 § 8204 (1980).
104. See, e.g., MICH. COMP. LAWS §§ 710.54-.69 (1979). In addition, courts interpret several
compensation statutes as prohibiting payments to surrogate mothers. See, e.g., Doe v. Kelley, 106
Mich. App. 169, 307 N.W.2d 438 (1981), cert denied, 459 U.S. 1183 (1983) (Michigan law precludes
payment to surrogate mother); see also Atty. Gen. No. 83-162 (Sept. 29, 1983) (Oklahoma statute
prohibits payments to surrogate mothers in excess of statutory limits).
105. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 26-10-8 (1977).
106. See, eg., GA. CODE ANN. § 74-418(a) (Supp. 1984).





112. Id. Alabama, for example, imposes a fine of $ 100 or imprisonment for up to three months,
or both, for inducing parents to part with their children. ALA. CODE § 26-10-9(a) (1977). The
imposition of a short jail term for buying a baby is not a "meaningful" penalty. See W. MEEZAN, S.
KATZ & E. Russo, supra note 3, at 186.
113. W. MEEZAN, S. KATZ & E. Russo, supra note 3, at 186. Delaware, for example, outlaws
independent adoptions but does not provide a statutory penalty for violations. Delaware's prohibi-
tion of independent adoptions, however, apparently effectively deters doctors and lawyers from plac-
ing children. Bradley, supra note 3, at 56.
114. See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 74-418(k) (Supp. 1984) (up to $10,000 fine or ten years in
prison, or both).
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placement agency without a license."' Another jurisdiction imposes a
$300 or ninety-day penalty, or both, for violation of its placement stat-
ute. 1 6 These penalties insufficiently deter black-marketers from taking
risks.
Other states, however, classify violations of their placement statutes as
felonies.' 17 One state imposes a fine of up to $5,000 or imprisonment of
up to five years, or both, for placing a child for adoption without a li-
cense." 8 This penalty more accurately reflects the seriousness of the
crime and provides greater deterrence.
CONCLUSION
Independent adoptions, if properly regulated, provide a useful alterna-
tive to agency adoptions." 9 Currently, however, many state adoption
statutes are inadequate and easily circumvented. 20 Other state adoption
statutes suggest that state legislatures have ignored independent adoption
practices.' 2' Independent adoption need not be prohibited. But states
must regulate independent adoption to preclude black-market activity.
The following proposed model statute would remedy many of the inade-
quacies of existing state statutes.122
§ 1. Who may place a child for adoption.
(A) A child may be placed for adoption only by:
(1) the department;
(2) a licensed child-placing agency;
(3) the child's biological parents, without the assistance di-
115. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 46-1406 (West 1982).
116. D.C. CODE ANN. § 32-1009 (1981).
117. These states are Florida, Maine and North Dakota. See Appendix II.
118. N.D. CENT. CODE § 50-12-17 (1974). For an argument that the adoption market should be
governed by the law of supply and demand, see Krones, Stimulation of Independent Adoption, 6
ORANGE CouNTY B.J. 192 (1979).
119. See supra note 9 and accompanying text. Proponents also claim that the independent adop-
tion procedure allows parents to avoid embarrassing interviews and impossible-to-meet standards of
agency adoptions. See Bradley, supra note 3, at 52 n.19.
120. See supra notes 35 & 36 and accompanying text. See also supra note 86 and accompanying
text.
121. See, eg., supra note 27. There are also indications that state legislatures do not update state
adoption laws to eliminate antiquated statutes. In South Carolina, for example, until 1981 it was
illegal to grant permanent custody of a white child to a black person. S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-17-460
(1976), repealed by 1981 Act No. 71 § 3 (effective May 19, 1981).
122. The proposed model statute is not intended as a comprehensive statutory scheme for the




rectly or indirectly, of an intermediary in the home of a
relative of the child within the 3rd degree; or
(4) an intermediary.
(B) Prior to placement of the child, the party so placing shall notify
the department in writing of the intent to place a child for
adoption.
(C) The requirement of (B) shall not apply in cases coming within
(A)(1) or (A)(2). 123
§ 2. Investigation Required.
(A) Except as provided in § 1, a child shall not be placed with pro-
spective adoptive parents until a preplacement report has been
filed with the court in which the petition for adoption is filed.
(B) The preplacement report shall be a written document setting
forth all relevant information relating to the fitness of the pro-
spective adoptive parent. The report shall be based on a study
that shall include an investigation of the home environment,
family life, health, facilities, and resources of the prospective
adoptive parent. The report shall include a list of the sources
of information on which the report is based. The report shall
include a recommendation as to the fitness of the prospective
parent to be an adoptive parent.
(C) Except as provided in § 1, the court shall order a postplace-
ment report made to determine if the placement is in the best
interests of the child. The report shall be prepared by the de-
partment, a licensed child-placing agency, or an individual ap-
proved by the court. The report shall be in writing and contain
all reasonably available information concerning the physical
and mental condition of the child, home environment, family
life, health, facilities, and resources of the prospective adoptive
parent, and any other facts and circumstances relating to the
propriety and advisability of the adoption. The report shall be
filed within ninety days of the date of appointment. The
preplacement report shall be made available to the person ap-
pointed to make the postplacement report. 124
§ 3. Jurisdiction and venue.
(A) Proceedings for adoption may be brought by bona fide resi-"
dents of this state only. The adoption petition may be brought
in the court of the county in which the petitioner resides, in
which the child resides, or in which the agency having custody
123. Cf MONT. CODE ANN. § 40-8-108 (1983).
124. Cf WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 26.33.180-.200 (Supp. 1985).
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of the child is located. 125
§ 4. Importation of children for adoption.
Any person, partnership, association, corporation, charitable agency,
or other entity undertaking to bring or to send a child into this state
for placement in foster care or as a preliminary to a possible adoption
shall furnish the department with written notice of the intention to
send, bring, or place the child in the state and shall obtain prior writ-
ten consent from the department for each child to be so placed. The
notice shall contain:
1. The name, date and place of birth of the child.
2. The identity and address or addresses of the parent or legal
guardian.
3. The name and address of the person, agency or institution to
or with which the child is proposed to be placed.
4. A full statement of the reasons for such proposed action and
evidence of the authority pursuant to which the placement is
proposed to be made.
5. Such supporting or additional information as the department
may deem necessary under the circumstances.
This section shall not apply to the sending or bringing of a child into
this state by his parent, stepparent, grandparent, adult brother or
sister, adult uncle or aunt, or his guardian and leaving the child with
any such relative or nonagency guardian in this state.
1 26
§ 4a. Exportation of children for adoption.
(A) No person except the department or a licensed child-placing
agency shall take or send a child out of the state for purposes of
placement for adoption unless the child is to be placed with a
relative within the third degree or a stepparent.
(B) No intermediary shall counsel the natural parents to leave the
state when it is the intention that the child is to be placed for
adoption outside the state.1 2
7
§ 5. Report ofpetitioner's expenditures.
(A) Except as specified in (D) of this section, the petitioner in any
proceeding for the adoption of a minor shall file, before the
petition is heard, a full accounting report in a manner accept-
able to the court of all disbursements of anything of value
made or agreed to be made by or on behalf of the petitioner in
125. Cf. S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-7-1680 (Law. Co-op. 1985).
126. Cf N.D. CENT. CODE § 50-12-14.1 (1982).




connection with the adoption. The report shall show any ex-
penses incurred in connection with:
(1) the birth of the minor;
(2) placement of the minor with petitioner;
(3) medical or hospital care received by the mother of the mi-
nor for adoption that were received by or on behalf of the
petitioner, either biological parent of the minor, or any
other person.
(B) The accounting report shall be itemized in detail and shall
show the dates of each payment and the names and addresses
of each attorney, doctor, hospital, licensed adoption agency, or
other person or organization who received any funds of the pe-
titioners in connection with the adoption or the placement of
the child with them, or participated in any way in the handling
of such funds, either directly or indirectly.
(C) To assure compliance with limitations or requirements imposed
by this section, the court may require sworn testimony from
persons who were involved in any way with the placement of
the child for adoption.
(D) This section does not apply to an adoption by a stepparent
whose spouse is a biological or adoptive parent of the child.'
28
§ 6. Penalties.
(A) It is unlawful for any person:
(1) To place a child for adoption in violation of § 1.
(2) To sell or surrender or to arrange for the sale or surrender
of a child to another person for money or anything of
value or to receive such minor child for such payment or
thing of value; however, nothing herein shall be construed
as prohibiting any person who is contemplating adopting
a child from paying actual pre- or post-natal care and liv-
ing expenses of the mother of the child to be adopted, nor
from paying actual living expenses of such mother for a
reasonable time, not to exceed 30 days, after the birth of
the child.
(3) Having the rights and duties of a parent with respect to
the care and custody of a minor to assign or transfer such
parental rights for the purpose of, incidental to, or other-
wise connected with, selling or offering to sell such rights
and duties.
128, Cf ALASKA STAT. § 25.23.090 (1983); CAL. CIV. CODE § 224r. (Deering 1971); MIcH.
COMP. LAWS § 710-.54(3) (1979).
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(4) To assist in the commission of any acts prohibited in
paragraphs (1), (2), or (3).
(B) It is unlawful for any intermediary to charge any fee other than
for actual documented medical costs, court costs, and hospital
costs unless such charges are approved by the court prior to
payment to the intermediary.
(C) Whoever violates any provision of §§ 1-5 is guilty of a felony, punish-
able by a fine of up to $10,000 or imprisonment of up to 5 years, or
both. 129
Paul T Fullerton
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Appendix I Key
Key
1. Placement by state agency allowed.
2. Placement by licensed child-placing agency allowed.
3. Placement by biological parent with relative allowed.
4. Placement by biological parent with nonrelative allowed.
5. Placement by intermediary allowed.
Key
1. Agency placement requirement may be waived.
2. Written approval of the Department of Public Welfare is required,
but may be waived.
3. Approval of the state department in charge of adoption is required.
4. The intermediary must be representing a specific couple at the time
that the child is surrendered to him.
5. Placement by parent or grandparent is allowed, but only after a
petition for adoption has been fied and the court sanctions the
placement.
6. Biological parents may place with nonrelatives only after they file a
notice of parental placement and the court approves of the placement
after investigation.
7. Placement may be made only after an investigation by the Welfare
Division.
8. Placement requirement is not imposed when the petitioner is the
child's sponsor at baptism, named in the deceased parents' will, or when
placement is made through a nationally recognized religious organiza-
tion.
9. The South Carolina statute makes reference to nonagency adoptions,
but there are no provisions expressly permiting such adoptions.
10. Relatives within the second degree may also place the child.
11. An intermediary may locate a child or adoptive parent, but may not
receive, accept, or provide care for the child without a license.
12. The intermediary must be the attorney, physician, or clergyman of
the biological parents.
13. Relatives within the third degree may also place the child.
14. An intermediary may place without a license if he is one who
"occasionally" places children for adoption.
[Vol. 63:753
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15. A person related to the child by blood, marriage, or adoption may
also place the child.
16. Op. Atty. Gen. (Regen), Dec. 28, 1979.
O = "Relative" typically includes stepparents, brothers, sisters, aunts,
uncles, and grandparents. See, e.g., N.Y. STAT. ANN. 9:3-39(a) (West
Supp. 1984).
X = This state has no provision expressly stipulating who may place, but
the statute implies who may place.
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Appendix H Key
1. Violation of placement statute.
2. Violation of compensation statute.
3. Violation of advertisement statute.
4. Violation of inducement statute.
C = Classification of crime
F = Felony
M = Misdemeanor
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